Buchanan's Blunder
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"Buchanan's Blunder" The Utah War, 1857-1858
By Richard D. Poll and Ralph W. Hansen
When the Mormons first settled in the Salt Lake Valley after being driven from Missouri and Illinois, Brigham Young vowed that "if the people of the United States will let us alone for ten years we will ask no odds of them." [Footnote 1: Brigham Young. Salt Lake City, Sept. 13, 1857. Journal of Discourses, Vol. V (1857), p. 226.]
On July 24, 1857, at the height of a three-day holiday marking the tenth anniversary of their arrival in the Great Basin, Young and his people had occasion to recall these words. At noon, when the proceedings were in full swing, four road-dusty men galloped into the camp in Big Cottonwood Canyon, where more than 2500 celebrants from all parts of Utah Territory were gathered. Their news was initially for the ears of Brigham and his key men only. Not until evening did Daniel H. Wells, counselor in the Mormon presidency and commander of the territorial militia, announce that the Utah mail contracts had been cancelled, mail service had been suspended and an army was on its way to suppress alleged rebellion in the territory.
[Footnote 2: The Mormon view regarding events that led to the expedition may be found in B. H. Roberts, A Comprehensive History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (6 vols.; Salt Lake City, 1930), Vol. IV, pp. 181-471. Also useful is Orson F. Whitney's History of Utah (4 vols.; Salt Lake City, 1892), Vol. 1, pp. 567-688. The political background is covered by Richard D. Poll, "The Mormon Question, 1850-1865: A Study in Politics and Public Opinion" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 1948). A useful contemporary account is Jesse A. Gove, The Utah Expedition, 1857-1858, Otis G. Hammond, ed. (Concord, New Hampshire: New Hampshire Historical Society, 1928). LeRoy R. Hafen and Ann W. Hafen have compiled the documents of this incident in The Utah Expedition 1857-1858 (Glendale, California: Arthur H. Clark, 1958). Ralph Hansen, "Administrative History of the Nauvoo Legion in Utah" (unpublished Master's Thesis, Brigham Young University, 1954), is a study of the Mormon militia during its twenty years of activity in Utah. A recent study not utilized for this article is Norman F. Furniss, The Mormon Conflict, 1850-1859 (New Haven: Yale, 1960).]
Perplexity and consternation at once beset the throng. Were the violent scenes of their earlier history to be repeated? Was it an army, or another anti-Mormon mob?
According to its orders, this force of 2500 men was a "posse comitatus," sent by President James Buchanan to insure the transfer of the Utah governorship from Brigham Young to a new appointee, Alfred Cumming. [Footnote 3: House Executive Documents, 35th Cong., 1st sess., No. 71, pp. 4-5 (Hereinafter cited as House Document No. 71).]
Both the size of the Utah Expedition and the secrecy of its movement suggest that the administration feared massive resistance.
Why?
"The community and, in part, the civil government of Utah Territory," declared General Winfield Scott's instructions to the expedition commander, "are in a state of substantial rebellion." [Footnote 4: Scott to Brig. Gen. W. S. Harney, June 29, 1857. House Executive Documents, 35th Cong., 1st sess., No. 2, p. 1]
Later statements by Buchanan stressed the same point. "The despotism of Brigham Young" being the only government recognized by the insubordinate Utah populace, "I could not mistake the path of duty. As chief executive magistrate, I was bound to restore the supremacy of the constitution and laws within its limits." [Footnote 5: James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents (Washington, 1911), Vol. VII, p. 2986.]
Since Utah in the spring of 1857 was, in fact, prosaically calm except for a little religious revivalism, the national alarm requires explanation. In the absence of political plots, secessionist manifestos, barricades and the military trappings of rebellion, what brought such diverse journals as the New York. Herald, the New York Times, the National Intelligencer and the Charleston Mercury to applaud Buchanan's action? What moved the editor of Harper's Weekly to sound this call to arms: "We do not call for fire or slaughter. No Highland clan sort of operation—no Glencoe massacre. But, at whatever cost, the United States must declare and vindicate its supremacy."? [Footnote 6: Harper's Weekly, April 25, 1857, p. 1.]
Part of the answer must be sought in the Utah communities, where the Saints, still smarting from earlier persecutions, wanted fervently to be unmolested. Tolerant and cooperative Gentiles might abide among them, but there was no place for hostile critics of the Mormon system, whose leader had declared in 1853, "I am and will be Governor, and no power can hinder it until the Lord Almighty says, 'Brigham, you need not be Governor any longer. [Footnote 7: Brigham Young. Salt Lake City, June 19, 1853. Journal of Discourses, Vol. 1 (1853), p. 187.]
Utah was a tightly-knit theocracy—orderly, productive and highly disciplined. All important elective offices were filled by Church nominees in uncontested elections, and all major public policies were formulated by the Church authority. To the overwhelming majority of the approximately 50,000 inhabitants, this was the Gospel plan, but to the handful of non-Mormons in the territory and most observers outside, it was un-American activity. The newly-announced practice of plural marriage only reinforced the general conviction that Mormonism deserved Stephen A. Douglas's epithet, "this loathsome, disgusting ulcer." [Footnote 8: SpringfieId, Illinois, June 12, 1857, as reported in New York Times, June 23, 1857, p. 1.]
That the ulcer required surgery was the vehement testimony of Federal officials and private citizens who had met rebuff in their dealings with the Saints. Judge Perry E. Brocchus was an early example; his scolding of polygamy in a Salt Lake City meeting in 1851 produced ostracism by the Saints and his quick withdrawal from the territory. His successor, an excommunicated Mormon, lasted longer but got along no better with the people; after his office was ransacked by nocturnal vandals, he also departed. An Indian agent of the upper Platte added charges of Mormon tampering with the red-men, and a former Utah mail contractor wrote luridly of alleged intimidation and lawlessness. The most notorious publicizer of the "Mormon menace" was Judge W. W. Drummond, who left a family in the East in 1856 and shared the bench in Utah with a strumpet whom he introduced as his wife. His reception was as cool as the Salt Lake winter, but his letter of resignation was warm enough to confirm Buchanan's derision to employ troops. [Footnote 9: Edward W. Tullidge, History of Salt Lake City (Salt Lake City, 1886), pp. 132-4.]
Two other factors played important parts.
Since the debates on the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Free Soilers and Republicans had been charging that the Democratic doctrine of "popular Sovereignty" was a cloak for Mormon iniquity, and the Republican platform of 1856 had demanded that Congress "prohibit in the territories those twin relics of barbarism, polygamy and slavery." Political considerations thus permitted no risk of successful Latter-day Saint defiance of the new administration. [Footnote 10: Poll, "The Mormon Question," pp. 90-94.]
Finally, inadequate communications must be mentioned. Had there been a transcontinental telegraph or railroad, there would almost certainly have been no military episode, because the facts did not support the alarms of either party to the conflict. But the administration chose not to delay for an official inquiry, and the mail embargo deprived Utah of accurate information on government intentions. Pressured by popular clamor for action, Buchanan launched the largest United States military operation between the Mexican and Civil Wars. Convinced that the alternatives were abandonment of their homes or submission to new anti-Mormon violence, the Saints prepared to defend their Great Basin commonwealth. [Footnote 11: Poll, "The Mormon Question," pp. 94-102.]
The Utah War was the result.
Once the decision to resist the oncoming army had been made, the Mormon leadership quickly translated it into action. To reinforce the defenses of Zion, the far-flung colonizing program of the Church was reversed. As far away as San Bernardino and Carson Valley, settlers sold their holdings, usually at a loss, and trekked back to Utah. L.D.S. missionaries in the East and overseas were advised to settle their business, pay the Church debts, and hurry home. Communities from Cache Valley in the North to the Virgin River in the South were instructed to husband supplies for a possible siege or protracted guerrilla operations. ''The time may come," declared Daniel Wells, ''when we shall have to lay everything waste and go into the mountains." [Footnote 12: "Record of the Provo Military District Command, 1857-58," pp. 3-4. Typescript in Brigham Young University Library (Hereinafter cited as "Provo Military District Command").]
The Utah militia, called the Nauvoo Legion after the military organization established by Joseph Smith in Nauvoo, Illinois, was ordered into readiness. The temper of its effort is reflected in this letter from Lieutenant General Wells to one of the Legion's officers:
"Reports, tolerably well authenticated, have reached this office that an army from the Eastern States is now en route to invade this Territory. The people of the Territory having lived in strict obedience to the Laws of the parent and home governments, and ever jealous for the supremacy of the Constitution and the rights guaranteed thereby; in such times, when anarchy takes the place of orderly Government and mobocratic tyranny userps the power to rule; they are left to their inalienable right to defend themselves against all aggression upon their Constitutional previleges. It is enough that for Successive years they have witnessed the desolation of their homes; the barbarous wrath of mobs poured upon their unoffending bretheren and Sisters; their leaders arrested, incarcerated and slain; and themselves driven to cull life from the hospitality of the desert and savage, they are not willing to endure longer these unceasing outrages, but if an exterminating war is purposed against them, and blood alone can cleanse pollution from the nations bulwarks, to the God of our fathers let the appeal be made." [Footnote 13: "Provo Military District Command" p.9]
The Legion, recently revitalized, had had field experience in the Walker War of 1853 and other minor Indian uprisings. In 1857 its strength was estimated at seven thousand men and boys, ranging in age from 14 to 45; perhaps a third were mounted. There were probably as many as four cannon at its disposal, including one hauled from San Francisco by members of the Mormon Battalion, but they would possess limited utility in such hit-and-run campaigning as was now proposed. [Footnote 14: Hansen, "Administrative History of the Nauvoo Legion," pp. 96-7.]
Although required by law to be outfitted with one "good" rifle, musket or yauger gun, many of the Legionnaires were ill-equipped for anything more serious than the weekly drill. To meet the emergency the Territorial legislature took over existing gunsmith facilities and pushed the production of weapons. A non-Mormon correspondent to the New York. Herald found on visiting the Salt Lake City armory that "Mechanics were busy in the manufacture of revolvers at the rate of twenty per week. The Mormons were quite pleased with the manufacture of this article and considered it equal, at least, to Colts." [Footnote 15: Deseret News, May 12, 1857, quoting the New York Herald, Feb. 23, 1858.]
Another small arms plant was established at Provo, forty miles to the south. [Footnote 16: "Provo Military District Command," p. 20.]
Powder and lead, also in short supply, were diligently sought in the mineral-rich mountains. The same report to the Herald stated that some excellent powder was being produced and that by spring "they will have it in abundance." [Footnote 17: Deseret News, May 12, 1857.]
The settlers who returned from Carson Valley reported that they left only two boxes of caps and one pound of powder in all the valley; they brought $800 worth of ammunition from California as well. [Footnote 18: Roberts, Comprehensive History, Vol. IV, p. 245.]
Early Mormon colonizers in Southern Nevada had discovered silver-lead deposits which were again worked for a short time. The quality of this ore gave rise to the later report that the Saints were shooting at the army with silver bullets.
Yet the casual visitor on the streets of Salt Lake in midsummer 1857 would have gained little impression of an impending war. Military uniforms were the responsibility of the individual. The officers of the Legion were generally in uniform, and as was the rule with the militia of the era, the higher the rank the more impressive the attire. The Herald correspondent found "several companies regularly uniformed but by far the greater portion of the Army in ordinary dress." [Footnote 19: Deseret News, May 12, 1857.]
These were the citizen soldiers, poorly equipped and armed but fairly disciplined and highly motivated, who were asked to hold back a professional army with a minimum of violence. They were prepared to fight if they must, but their assignment was to delay the army in the hope of a happier outcome. This intent was emphasized in a circular signed by Young and Wells on September 16, which concluded: "Let there be no waste. Save life always when it is possible. We do not wish to shed a drop of blood if it can be avoided. This course will give us great influence abroad." [Footnote 20: "Provo Military District Command," p. 25.]
Meanwhile, preparations for the westward march by the United States Army had been slowly developing. On May 28, 1857, General Winfield Scott had ordered the "assemblage of a body of troops at Fort Leavenworth, to march thence to Utah as soon as assembled." [Footnote 21: Whitney, History of Utah, Vol. 1, p. 592.]
The units assigned to the expedition were the 2nd Dragoons, 5th Infantry, 10th Infantry, and Phelps's battery of the 4th Artillery, with an authorized strength of not less than 2500 men. For this force enough rations for six months' subsistence were to be transported by Russell, Majors and Waddell, who employed 360 men, 312 wagons and 3298 oxen and mules in the enterprise. [Footnote 22: "The Utah War: Journal of Captain Albert Tracy, 1858-1860," Utah Historical Quarterly, Vol. XIII (January, 1945), p. xii.]
As late as June 29, when the expedition's commander, Brigadier General W. S. Harney, received his letter of instructions, the army was not yet ready to move west. Harney, fearing the lateness of the season would prevent reaching Salt Lake before winter, unsuccessfully advised against a move at this time; his subsequent replacement as commander may have been due in part to this lack of enthusiasm.
When the expedition began its long journey on July 19, supply trains were already spread hundreds of miles across the plains. The initial movement was under the field command of Colonel E. B. Alexander, who reached Fort Laramie on September 1, the day on which Albert Sidney Johnston was appointed to take Harney's place. Colonel Johnston did not catch up with his troops until early November, when the advance elements were near Fort Bridger. During all this period the unfortunate Alexander proceeded without orders on how to respond if resistance were met, and with all the disadvantages attendant upon temporary command. Little wonder that his officers recorded distaste for his leadership; Captain Jesse A. Gove's correspondence, a major source of information about the army's movements, refers to Alexander as "the old woman." [Footnote 23: Gove, The Utah Expedition, p. 78.]
First official contact between the military and the Mormon leadership came in early September, when Captain Stewart Van Vliet arrived in Salt Lake to make preliminary arrangements for provisions and encampment. Van Vliet, who had dealt with the Mormons previously, was courteously received and entertained. He attempted to allay the people's fears, but he was without specific authority either to state the government's intentions or to negotiate, and he failed. [Footnote 24: Roberts, Comprehensive History, Vol. TV, pp. 257-8.]
In a Church gathering attended by the captain, Young defended the Mormon position, reiterated fidelity to the Constitution and warned that the troops were in an untenable position. Recalling his words of a decade earlier, he boldly declared, "In the name of Israel's God, we ask no odds of them."
Upon Van Vliet's departure, Young issued a proclamation of martial law which forbade the army to enter Utah Territory and sent new orders to the Nauvoo Legionnaires who were already east of South Pass. [Footnote 25: The proclamation is reproduced in Gove, The Utah Expedition, p. 60, also in Nels Anderson, Desert Saints: The Mormon Frontier in Utah (Chicago, 1942), p. 173.]
Their substance was later tersely reiterated by General Wells: "Take no life, but destroy their trains, and stampede or drive away their animals, at every opportunity." [Footnote 26: Roberts, Comprehensive History, Vol. IV, p. 280, also House Documents No. 71, pp. 56-7.]
A reconnaissance party under Legion Colonel Robert T. Burton had reached Fort Bridger August 21, under instructions to learn the strength of the forces reported on the way to Utah, but "not to interfere with the life or property of anyone they might encounter on the road." [Footnote 27: Vaux [Junius F. Wells], ''The Echo Canyon War," The Contributor, Vol. Ill (March, 1882), p. 178.]
The fort and nearby Fort Supply were at this time Mormon trading posts and emigrant supply depots. Here Captain Joshua Clark of Provo joined Burton, and the combined force of eighty men moved eastward toward the Sweetwater River, meeting both Mormon emigrants and government supply trains along the way. The latter were without military escort of any kind. [Footnote 28: Captain Richard W. Young, "The Nauvoo Legion," The Contributor, Vol. IX (August, 1888), p. 363. Young (West Point, 1882), a grandson of Brigham Young, later served as brigadier-general of the Utah National Guard.]
Burton continued eastward across the North Platte and on September 21 made contact with the approaching troops. What he and three other reconnoitering officers saw was not reassuring, for this trained and well-armed body was in sharp visible contrast to their own farmer-soldiery. Undaunted, they proceeded to carry out new orders which altered their scouting mission into one of guerrilla warfare. On the night of September 24 the mounted Legionnaires charged through the army's camp, yelling and firing into the air. The object was to stampede the horses, but it only put the troops on guard to prevent a repetition of the occurrence. Satisfied that they could do no more at this point, Burton's command returned to Bridger. [Footnote 29: Captain Richard W. Young, "The Nauvoo Legion," The Contributor, Vol. IX (August, 1888), p. 363-364]
The expedition soon found itself faced with a determined enemy. Small patrols under such men as Porter Rockwell and Lot Smith burned the grass in front and on both sides of the advancing force. Whenever possible, wagon trains were stopped and turned back or burned. On the night of October 4, Major Smith's command of 23 men captured two camped trains at the Green River and prepared to put them to the torch. "For God's sake, don't burn the trains," cried the wagon master. "It is for His sake that I am going to burn them," the Mormon replied, and 51 wagons went up in smoke. Twenty-three wagons from a third train were destroyed that same night. [Footnote 30: Roberts, Comprehensive History, Vol. IV, p. 282, also in Wells, "The Echo Canyon War," Vol. III (June, 1882), p. 272. Wells quotes Lot Smith's acccount given from memory some years later.]
On occasion the Mormons ran into a recalcitrant train master who wanted to fight for his wagons. Support from other drivers was lacking, however, since they defined their job as whacking bulls, not Mormons. When the Legion inadvertently raided guarded trains, the admonition not to shed blood led to "retreat which was done without delay." [Footnote 31: "Diary of Henry Weeks Sanderson," p. 102. Typescript in Brigham Young University Library.]
This deliberate evasion of combat was infuriating to soldiers who were eager to come to grips with the enemy. The result, however, was no combat fatalities on either side, unless the infantryman be counted who was reported to have "died of fright" during a nocturnal raid on the army's livestock. [Footnote 32: Gove, The Utah Expedition, p. 65.]
As U.S. cavalry units finally reached the Green River country, Legion operations were restricted to these raids on cattle herds, which brought almost a thousand head of stock into the Salt Lake Valley.
Captain Gove's letters to his wife reveal an initial contempt for the Mormon strategy of burning wagons and grasslands. Later, as winter approached, he reported ruefully that only two days' animal subsistence was on hand, with the result that "when our animals die our supplies are left as we have no means of transportation; our very existence depends solely upon our present supplies as nothing is raised in the country that can be obtained." [Footnote 33: Gove, The Utah Expedition, p. 85.]
In the latter part of September, mobilization orders went out to Legion units in and around Salt Lake City. So pressing was the need that even the Silver Greys, men over 45, were called up. The cavalry assembled at Fort Bridger, where they were met by General Wells. After burning both Bridger and Supply on October 3, the five hundred mounted men were divided into smaller units and joined Burton and Smith. [Footnote 34: Young, "The Nauvoo Legion," p. 366.]
While the guerrillas harassed the adversary, the Mormon infantry assembled at Camp Weber, near Echo Canyon, and built fortifications along this most plausible route into Salt Lake Valley. It was felt that the entrance of the troops could be greatly hindered, perhaps even prevented, in this narrow canyon. Ditches were dug across the road, embankments of logs were thrown up and breastworks of stone were placed on ridges along the canyon walls. Captain Van Vliet, while returning to the Army, noted the great advantage a defensive force would have in such a restricted area.
After the hostilities had ceased, the members of the expedition who came through Echo Canyon made light of the fortifications. Even where the canyon was only about forty feet wide, with perpendicular rock walls, the New York. Herald correspondent felt that "this terrible pass . .. could be taken by a flock of sheep, because there is an easy ascent to the top of the ridge at the left of it." [Footnote 35: Gove, The Utah Expedition, p. 295.]
The reporter did not say what the Mormons would be doing during the "easy ascent." A marker in the canyon today directs attention to some of the rock fortifications which remain.
As his advance units entered Mormon country, Colonel Alexander was faced with the unenviable necessity of making a command decision on plans for the winter. He chose to move on Salt Lake from the north, hoping to avoid the Echo Canyon defenses by following the horseshoe course of the Bear River. If, upon reaching the north-south route, winter forced him to halt, the Colonel felt that he could find good valleys for wintering troops in the Wind River Mountains. On making contact with Alexander in October, Colonel Johnston learned of this decision and with justifiable apprehension recalled the troops. [Footnote 36: William P. Johnston, The Life of Albert Sidney Johnston (New York, 1878), p. 212.]
The Bear River route was twice as long as the direct approach; if the Legion had scorched the earth on the direct route, it was certain that the same course would be pursued regardless of which way the troops advanced.
On November 3 Colonel Johnston joined his army at Harris Fork, twenty miles east of the blackened ruins of Fort Bridger. His reception was so enthusiastic that the Mormon scouts were sure an advance on Salt Lake was in the offing. Immediate steps were taken to meet the threat. About 2500 of the Legion were concentrated near the Echo fortifications, and several thousand others were within 24 hours call. [Footnote 37: Young, "The Nauvoo Legion," p. 372.]
Johnston made his move on November 6, but the same day nature interceded for the Saints. Winter struck in a fury. Winds, snow, and cold were such that Gove wrote, "My dear Maria, it is quite Russian." [Footnote 38: Gove, The Utah Expedition, p. 92.]
The scorched earth policy of the Mormons now resulted in an acute shortage of supplies and forage, which strengthened the analogy with Napoleonic history. The last army units took fifteen days to reach Bridger, and the loss of horses and mules was so severe that Johnston had to send a detachment under Captain Randolph B. Marcy to New Mexico for fresh animals for the spring advance on Salt Lake. [Footnote 39: Johnston, Albert Sidney Johnston, p. 214.]
Without the firing of a shot for other than sound effect, a major campaign of the United States Army had been frustrated. The Utah Expedition was immobilized for the winter, unable to move forward or backward. What was left of Fort Bridger was used as a supply base, and the tent city for approximately 2,000 military personnel and their civilian following which grew up nearby was named Camp Scott, after the General-in-Chief. Governor Cumming and other Federal officials arrived on November 19, but the civil jurisdiction over Utah Territory which they immediately proclaimed was not recognized beyond the picket lines of the camp. Early in December the Nauvoo Legion guard in Echo Canyon was reduced to fifty men, and eventually ten, while an occasional Mormon scouting party patrolled the vicinity of Camp Scott through the winter.
During the cold sojourn in northeastern Utah Territory the Army's discomfort was aggravated by a shortage of salt. Assistant Adjutant General Fitzjohn Porter later explained that "as the army was bound to Salt Lake Valley, the Government regarded sending salt for rations as unnecessary—'Coals to Newcastle." [Footnote 40: Johnston, Albert Sidney Johnston, p. 218.]
Brigham Young discovered the shortage from army deserters and immediately sent eight hundred pounds of the precious commodity to Johnston, with a message stating that the supply should last until spring, "when the army should retrace its steps to the United States." [Footnote 41: Johnston, Albert Sidney Johnston, p. 219, quoting a letter from General Fitz-John Porter to the author.]
The officer who was soon to don Confederate gray tersely replied that he would accept "no favors from traitors and rebels and that any communication which they might in future hold with the army must be under flag of truce." [Footnote 42: Roberts, Comprehensive History, Vol. IV, p. 308.]
Two weeks later a thousand pounds of salt arrived from Fort Laramie.
While the frostbitten and bitter soldiers cursed both the government and the Mormons for their predicament, events in Washington and Salt Lake City moved toward a compromise solution which was to deprive them of the satisfaction of getting even with the followers of Brigham when fighting weather returned.
The initial move for a peaceful settlement almost certainly came from Utah's leadership, whose "shed no blood" policy has already been mentioned. That the Saints would have fought or burned their homes and fled if the army attacked is not improbable. But both the character and the conduct of Brigham Young suggest that he intended nothing more serious than a demonstration of L.D.S. solidarity which might capture the public fancy and "make the General Government show their true colours." [Footnote 43: Millenial Star, Nov. 28, 1857, p. 761]
To be let alone was still the hope, and a battle with the army was hardly likely to produce that outcome.
As early as mid-August, 1857, Young sent Samuel W. Richards east with a message which Colonel Thomas L. Kane, a long-time friend of the Saints, was to relay to the President. The content of the message is not known, but Richards assured reporters that the Mormon intentions were pacific. Utah Territorial Delegate John M. Bernhisel accompanied Captain Van Vliet to Washington in the autumn and took his seat in the House of Representatives in spite of a move to bar him. In December Kane and Bernhisel joined forces in an effort to reach an understanding with Buchanan. [Footnote 44: Poll, "The Mormon Question," pp. 109, 116-118.]
Meanwhile the once-enthusiastic American press had begun to question the "hasty" military move toward Utah. The sharp commercial and financial slump beginning in August emphasized the enormous expense of putting down a "rebellion" which was still only a matter of hearsay. The administration was undoubtedly desirous of terminating the Utah affair to quiet this criticism and strengthen its hand for the forthcoming Congressional debate on Kansas statehood.
Mutual interest thus promised to be served by the late December meeting between Buchanan and Colonel Kane. The son of Pennsylvania Federal District Judge John K. Kane and brother of Arctic explorer Elisha K. Kane offered to go to Utah as mediator. The President did not find it expedient to make an official and public appointment, but the letter of introduction which he gave Kane strongly suggests that the bearer was expected to succeed in his mission. The subsequent conduct of both Kane and Buchanan supports the same conclusion. [Footnote 45: Poll, "The Mormon Question," pp. 118-123.]
The colonel traveled to Salt Lake via Panama as rapidly as possible, using the assumed name of Dr. Osborne during the last stage of the trip. His arrival late in February 1858 produced a warm public reception and a round of conferences with the Mormon leaders. Evidence on his private interview with Young is fragmentary, but he almost certainly gave assurances of the government's desire for a quick and peaceful settlement and received comparable pledges from the Mormon chief.
After a delay to recuperate from his fatiguing journey, Kane left Salt Lake on March 8 for Camp Scott and an audience with Governor Cumming. His unexpected arrival was not welcomed by Johnston and the military, some of whom regarded him as a Mormon spy; Captain Gove recorded that "My men want to hang him." [Footnote 46: Gove, The Utah Expedition, p. 134.]
(Editor note: This short, negative quote from Gove is taken out of context, after comparing the short quote with the actual text in the Gove letters, which are now available online. Gove's comment was on March 12th when Kane first arrived in camp. By March 16th, Gove was also distrustful of Kane and his intentions.)
However, the colonel found a receptive friend in Cumming, who was by April 5 convinced of the propriety of going to the Mormon capital in advance of the troops.
While Cumming was being won over, Young was retreating from his earlier public stand against admitting the army to Utah. In a council on March 18 he recommended that the Saints "go into the desert and not war with the people, but let them destroy themselves." [Footnote 47: "Brigham Young Manuscript History," 1858, p. 266. L.D.S. Church Historian's Office.]
The plan to abandon Salt Lake and all the northern communities was apparently insurance against the possibility that Kane's negotiations failed and the army advanced in a war-like manner. It may also have been a further bid for support in the East and abroad; at least it elicited some sympathy from editors and Congressmen who had already taken a dim view of the whole administration undertaking. In any event, instructions to cache furniture and fixtures in mountain hideaways suggest that expectation—or at least the hope—of return to the deserted homes.
As Governor Cumming approached Salt Lake in early April he was duly impressed by the military preparations of the Mormons. Since he passed through Echo Canyon at night, the Nauvoo Legion had opportunity to use an old ruse to give the impression of superior manpower. The guards built signal fires for many miles along the route, which illuminated the road and at the same time blinded any traveler who might wish to look beyond the flames. Around each fire, for the benefit of the governor, was an aggregation of armed men. What the governor did not see was the mad scramble as the same group hastened from fire to fire ahead of the official party.
At Salt Lake the reception was at least outwardly friendly, expressions of law-abiding intent being mixed with indignation and fear concerning the army's intentions. The exodus, already in progress, continued. It is to Cumming's credit that ten days after his arrival he was able to advise Johnston that he had been "universally greeted with such respectful attentions as are due to the representatives of the executive authority of the United States in the Territories." [Footnote 48: House Executive Documents, 35th Cong., 2nd sess., No. 2, Vol. n, p. 72.]
A similar report was sent to Washington.
At the national capital events were also moving to a peaceful conclusion, even as the War Department raised the assigned strength of the Utah Expedition to 5900 officers and enlisted men and Congress approved deficiency appropriations and volunteer regiments for the campaign. Without awaiting the outcome of the Kane mission but with reason to be optimistic, Buchanan advanced farther along the path of diplomacy. On April 25 Ben McCulloch, the Texas Ranger hero, and Senator Lazarus W. Powell, of Kentucky, left for Utah Territory with a presidential proclamation of amnesty.
The document, dated April 6, called the Mormons' attention to the folly of resistance, assured that the government was anxious to prevent "the effusion of blood," and offered to the inhabitants of Utah "who shall submit to the laws, free pardon for the seditions and treasons heretofore by them committed." Those rejecting the offer would be rigorously dealt with by the army, which would not be withdrawn until the inhabitants of the territory "shall manifest a proper sense of the duty which they owe to this government." [Footnote 49: Richardson, Messages and Documents, Vol. VII, pp. 3024-6.]
The peace commissioners delivered their message early in June, and, although some of the Church leaders were dissatisfied with the accusations it expressed, the terms were accepted. Said Brigham Young: "I have no character—no pride to gratify—no vanity to please. If a man comes from the moon and says he will pardon me for kicking him in the moon yesterday, I don't care about it. I'll accept his pardon." [Footnote 50: Roberts, CompTehensive History, Vol. IV, p. 433.]
While the commissioners were completing their mission, President Buchanan was submitting Cumming's letter to Congress with this comment: "From this there is reason to believe that our difficulties with the Territory of Utah have terminated." [Footnote 51: John Bassett Moore, ed., The Works of James Buchanan (Philadelphia, 1910), Vol. X, pp. 217-218.]
On June 14 Cumming proclaimed a "free and full pardon" for past offenses to all Utahns who would subsequently "submit themselves to the laws and to the authority of the federal government." [Footnote 52: Hafen, The Utah Expedition, p. 319.]
But if the war was thus legally concluded, one chapter remained to be written in Utah. "That scourage and calamity for any people —the army" was still camped on the doorstep of Salt Lake, and no talk of peace could completely allay the Mormons' fears. The previously launched evacuation of northern Utah went on unabated. When McCulloch and Powell arrived in the territorial capital they found that the leaders of the Church had already reached Provo on their journey south, and only with difficulty did they and Cumming prevail upon President Young to return briefly. Assurances were obtained from the army's commander that "there need not be the slightest apprehension that any person whatever will have cause of complaint against it." [Footnote 53: William Mulder and A. Russell Mortensen, Among the Mormons (New York: Knopf, 1958), p. 308.]
Still no move was made by the refugees. The city of the Saints, prepared for the flames, presented this appearance to the wife of Governor Cumming when she arrived a few days in advance of the soldiers:
"I was not prepared for the death like stillness which existed. A large, beautiful City, the houses all separate—each with its garden—wide streets, with a pebbly stream running on each side—city capable of containing twenty thousand inhabitants. The gardens full of flowers and vegetables and promise of fruit—but the doors of all houses were closed—not a window to be seen— only boards instead. Not a carriage or wagon or mule or horse or man to be seen. Mountains all around us looking into the clear atmosphere, but a few feet from us—snow on the tops, green below—and the rushing of the water on each side the only sound. The valley city covers a level area of several miles—and one wondered when one should awake from a dream—or tried to look away from the pictured place. It did not seem real, but you could not look away." [Footnote 54] (Editor note: Quoted without citation printed in original work.)
So the city remained until June 26, when the troops marched through without incident, enroute to the unoccupied valley on the west side of Utah Lake where Camp Floyd was soon to arise. Four days later the first families left Provo to return to their homes.
This was the Utah War. At a cost estimated between $20,000,000 and $40,000,000, the United States Army received field experience and lessons in geography; Russell, Majors and Waddell made enough profit to become objects of Congressional investigation; and the Democratic administration complicated its already difficult political situation. "Buchanan's Blunder" made Alfred Cumming the governor of Utah Territory, but Brigham Young remained the governor of the people. Thirty-eight years were yet to elapse before legislative pressure and changing economic and social circumstances accomplished what military invasion had not— accommodation of the Saints to the demands of American public opinion and admission of the State of Utah into the American Union.
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