Union Pacific Motive Power Assignments

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This page was last updated on May 26, 2024.

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Steam To Diesel

The transition of motive power during the 1950s was determined by the number of diesels that could replace steam. The majority of steam on the Salt Lake City to Los Angeles run was replaced in the late 1940s and early 1950s. This was when Ashby was president. When Jeffers was president, he stayed with steam, primarily on the basis that the UP owned the coal reserves and operated the mines, which they thought provided cheap fuel. Ashby paid attention to the minute details of bookkeeping and knew the cost savings with diesels. The territory west of Salt Lake City also had difficulty with its water supply, and diesels certainly helped take care of that problem.

First, the South-Central District dieselized, then the Northwestern District dieselized. These changes meant that many of the operational steam locomotives were moved into the Eastern District to "run out their time." Many 2-8-0s from Idaho and Oregon ended up in Nebraska and Kansas. The smaller (3800 series) Challengers moved east and ran out their miles on the Nebraska Division. Additional diesels continued to be delivered and steam power was displaced accordingly.

Early 1956 was the end for the 4-6-2 Pacifics, the 4-8-2 Mountains and 9000-class 4-12-2s. 1957 was the last year for steam west of Laramie, as well as the last year for coal burning Challengers. 1957 was also the last year for the 800-class 4-8-4s on passenger trains when diesels were not available.

The arrival of the 300-class GP9s in 1957 was the beginning of the end. The gas turbines took over duties east of Ogden on the main line, and as they increased in numbers their service was extended eastward into Nebraska as well.

By the mid-1950s, freight traffic on the UP west of Green River was essentially dieselized. The Northwestern District was worked by F7s and F3s (and after their rebuilding, F9s). Until about 1957, FM road switchers and Erie builts worked the main line and branches between Hinkle and Spokane, known as "The Washy." Switchers appeared to be mostly EMD, with a few Fairbanks Morse units holding down some assignments.

With the arrival of large numbers of GP9s in the early 1950s south and west of Salt Lake City, the EMD F3 and F7 cab units were sent to the Northwestern District, which also sent the remaining Alco FA cab units to the Eastern District and the Fairbanks Morse units to the NWD. Switchers were predominantly, if not exclusively, EMD. The Eastern district was the realm of the Alco and Baldwin switchers and road switchers.

On the Eastern District (Kansas and Nebraska divisions) after the mid 1950s, there was a good representation of Alco power, including PA and FA cab units, and RSC2 road switchers, along with EMD F3/F7 and E-units. The Omaha Shops were part of the reason that older power seemed to gravitate to the Eastern District. They were the "ALCo shop," then later, home to the last EMD 567- engines like the GP9s, GP30s and GP35s as well as the DD35s. In the later years, one UP official is reported to have said that GP30s were kept in "the triangle," the mainlines between the three main points of North Platte-Omaha- Kansas City.

By the end of the steam era in 1958 and 1959, the gas turbines, Standard, Veranda and three-unit, along with GP9s and F-units, handled traffic west of Green River. The delivery of SD24s in 1959 bumped the GP9s on the South-Central District to a more secondary role. Though SD24s ruled the S-CD, they were seen across the rest of the system. Into the 1960s, the SD24s remained in control on the S-CD, but photographic evidence suggests that the GP30 was the locomotive of choice on the Northwestern District, replacing the F-units and reducing the role of GP9s to largely local and secondary service.

The arrival of the double diesels in 1963-1965, and the SD40s in 1966 and SD45s in 1968, seemed to diminish apparent areas of assignment across the system. The Radio Control-equipped SD45s in 1968 were popular on the NWD. SD45s were also assigned to the Kaiser pool, also in 1968, and were confined west of Salt Lake City. But U50Cs and DD35s roamed the whole railroad. There were small pockets remaining where oddballs or small groups of locomotives called home. The 3040-series SD40Xs, for example, on the iron ore trains through Salt Lake City, and SDP35s in their last few years serving as leading units between Council Bluffs and North Platte on C&NW run-through trains.

System-Wide Pool

Major changes came in 1969 with the implementation of a "System-wide Pool" of mainline power. This strategy did away with the previous district and divisional assignments, and resulted in less regional assignment and usage of power. This was in response to John Kenefick becoming president and wanting to more efficiently use the railroad's locomotives.

The following comes from Union Pacific Motive Power Review 1968-77:

One step to improve motive power utilization was taken in 1969. According to the UP Bulletin on the subject, effective July 4, "... the pooling of power system-wide is in effect. All power other than that assigned on locals will be pooled immediately and will move on trains to destination, regardless of district to which previously assigned." The bulletin went on to say that units should be closely watched and that, when possible, units should not be fueled in Iowa or Utah where a fuel tax would have to be paid. Further, units, especially at Pocatello, Idaho, should be operated on a first in, first out basis, giving preference to SD40s and SD45s in returning power to the Eastern District. This system-wide pooling did a great deal to improve utilization of power, but it also meant that parts for all models had to be stocked at all servicing points. (Union Pacific Motive Power Review 1968-77, page 59; Motive Power Services, 1978)

Performance records were kept, recording and comparing each locomotive model's age, component design, performance, and rate of failure. AFter the data was gathered and examined, chnages were made, system-wide. The intent was to keep the newer more reliable motive on the move as much as possible, and using the older less reliable models only as needed or in secondary service.

By the mid 1970s, the SDP35s were most often found leading on North Platte-Fremont-Council Bluffs manifest run through trains from the other railroads, including CNW, MILW, and Rock Island. The DDA35s and DD35s were most often running in the North Platte-Salt Lake City-Los Angeles corridor. The U30Cs and later C30s were used in manifest service, generally east of North Platte, often on the run through trains. In coal service they ran as far west as the southern Wyoming mines, then east to the train's destination, usually in run through service.

The U50Cs, when they were running, were kept on the Denver-North Platte-Council Bluffs-Kansas City routes, generally avoiding the heavier grades of the Wyoming division and west. The DDA40Xs and 8000 class SD40-2s were most often found on the various high priority intermodal trains operating between North Platte and the Pacific Northwest, and Los Angeles. Since those units weren't considered acceptable as run through power, they weren't often seen as often east of North Platte, or on the trains movig to and from Western Pacific and Southern Pacific. The SD45s were nearly always west of North Platte, usually moving to and from the Pacific Northwest, and on the Kaiser coal trains in cooperation with the DRGW between Utah and California.

Operation Control Center

In the days before Operation Control was established in 1976, there was considerable planning that took place between the Chief Dispatcher's office and the Mechanical Foreman's office in each division and district. The locomotive conditions and availability was under the jurisdiction of the mechanical department. The train movements and requirements for motive power was the Chief Dispatcher's responsibility.

The Chief Dispatcher worked with the roundhouse foremen to determine what power would be used, based on it being released for service by the mechanical department. There was a big board in every engine dispatcher's office had engine numbers shown with an 'OK' and that is what they picked from. Train tonnage was determined by the Chief Dispatcher and information passed on to the Yardmaster.

The daily use of motive power was under the control of the Chief Dispatcher, under the jurisdiction of the Division Superintendent. Between the Chief Dispatcher's office and the Engine Dispatcher (under jurisdiction of the Mechanical Foreman) they determined what the power situations would be.

In what would later become the Operation Control Center, Omaha began looking for a system for better power utilization, and they knew that the Chief Dispatchers were keeping some power on hand (in other words "hiding" power) to take care of situations where there may be a failure. But the Chiefs also were not reporting every failure because they had the authority to change power assignments as needed to keep the trains running.

As an example, the turbines failed more than the President of the railroad ever heard about. That was the reason it was decided to put on the multiple-unit GP9s, so they could drag the train in to a terminal. There is a story that in one case of a turbine failure getting close to Cheyenne from the east, and that the 600 horsepower "donkey engine" in the A-unit brought the train into Cheyenne.

However, Omaha won the battle, as the bean counters were seeing too many hours of power that was held by the Chief Dispatcher for those "just in case" situations. This was in the early 1970s and was when the Operation Control Center in Omaha was established, selecting individuals from each of the dispatching offices across the system and relocating them to Omaha. This was the beginning of the end of the Chief Dispatchers having the authority to hide power. It was a "tough nut to crack" and took some time to change the culture. One Chief didn't want to lose his authority and fought the concept of an Omaha Operation Control Center from its inception. The Vice President of Operations, along with the General Manager, and the Division Superintendents called the Chief Dispatchers in for a meeting in the VPO's business car as it traveled across the system, and they were told in no uncertain terms that they would do exactly what Operation Control wanted.

After Operation Control was established in Omaha, the Chief Dispatchers kept track of train movements, and maintained daily records that were reported to the Superintendent, who reported to the General Manager. This included any trains that had delays, any schedules that were not met, and the reasons for each. Each dispatcher was required to check with trains as to their speed over certain locations where there were some grades, also, any units not loading were noted, and anything that was a reason for not keeping to the schedule.

Having a central control in the form of Operation Control resulted in Chief Dispatchers communicating with Omaha in every situation that delayed a train, even the smallest and seemingly inconsequental. These small events might have included a unit in the consist not loading properly, thereby slowing the overall train speed. Omaha would be called, and instructions given to swap units as needed, which usually resulted in additional delays for other trains. Many local conditions that a Chief Dispatcher once handled frequently, was then in the hands of Omaha.

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